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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the results of 4th grade reading and mathematics as well as critical school 
and non-school factors to determine what happened to student outcomes during the peak years of 
NCLB, 2003-2009. Converting each state’s reported percent proficient to a NAEP scale 
equivalent (NSE) using equipercentile linking has been done in numerous federally 
commissioned reports. Such a conversion enables comparisons of student performance across 
states and over time utilizing a standardized and stable metric. This study adds to the existing 
literature by examining how each NSE correlates to policy-relevant and reform-relevant school 
factors such as location (urban/rural), class size, and per pupil revenue in addition to critical   
non-school factors such as race, income, family structure, and parents’ level of education. 
Furthermore, using each NSE conversion’s relative error, or RE, these correlations are weighted 
down or up using the inverse of RE (1/RE) to determine the validity of the patterns being 
observed. In fourth grade mathematics, the NSE was negatively affected by percent African 
American, percent of poverty, and percent of urban and rural schools. In fourth grade reading, 
the NSE was negatively affected by percent African American, percent urban/rural schools, and 
class size. This study suggests that policies aimed at improving student outcomes have a 
deleterious impact on already disadvantaged students, and that policy decisions based on state-
reported percent proficient have the unfortunate consequence of masking lower standards of 
learning for these same students. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of this Study 
The central challenge in evaluating No Child Left Behind (NCLB) has been associated 
with the absence of a uniformly common set of outcomes across the 50 individual states, each of 
which was charged with developing its own assessment system (tests, reporting conventions, 
evaluation practices, etc.) aligned with its own statewide curricular standards. This has 
prohibited an overall national assessment as well as between-state comparisons (Rothstein, 
2004). Moreover, since assessment systems and curricula can and do change over time, even 
longitudinal evaluations for the same states have been problematic (Cronin et al., 2007, 2009).  
This dissertation takes a critical step back to address what happened to student outcomes 
in NCLB’s peak years, from 2003 to 2009: Was the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) successful 
in accomplishing its basic goal (“to leave no child behind”)? Did states improve student 
performance? How did they vary in this regard and why? What factors explain differences across 
the states and over time?  
Although the federal government has an established history of using funding strategies to 
influence the priorities and curricula of local schools, the 2002 reauthorization of The 
Elementary and Secondary Act – more commonly known as No Child Left Behind – ushered in 
an era of high-stakes accountability that included a cascading menu of punitive sanctions for 
schools that failed to achieve performance targets. Ostensibly, this reform was designed to 
provide historically disadvantaged students with a better education and close the achievement 
gap between minority students and their white classmates (Lowell, 2004; Hursh, 2007; Loveless, 
2007). But decades of education reform research dating to the landmark Coleman Report (1966) 
provide compelling evidence that the most significant variables influencing student learning lay 
outside the educational sphere of control (see also Coleman, 1988; Jeffrey, 1978; Davis-Kean, 




2005; Darling-Hammond, 2007; Sharkey and Elwert, 2011). 
Social scientist Donald Campbell established Campbell's Law, a theoretical premise 
asserting that “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt 
the social processes it was intended to monitor” (Nichols and Berliner, 2007, pp. 43). Similarly, 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that incentives based on quantifiable measures will lead 
organizations to prioritize the most easily observable aspects of a complex task. As a result, any 
system of educational accountability that fails to account racial, economic, or regional disparities 
– differences that manifest themselves in critical school and non-school characteristics – 
incentivizes an organizational response that is favorable to the self-preservation and good 
standing of the organization.  
In this dissertation, I will evaluate the effectiveness of NCLB by using both the state-
reported proficiency information and the results of each state’s performance on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the gold standard in educational assessment. I 
utilize a novel measure, the NAEP scale equivalency (NSE) utilized in numerous federally 
commissioned studies to map the results of fourth grade mathematics and reading onto the more 
stable and standardized scale of the NAEP.  
However, this study goes one step further by examining how each NSE correlates to 
policy-relevant and reform-relevant school factors such as location (urban/rural), class size, and 
per pupil revenue in addition to critical   non-school factors such as race, income, family 
structure, and parents’ level of education. Furthermore, using each NSE conversion’s relative 
error, or RE, these correlations are weighted down or up using the inverse of RE (1/RE) to 
determine the validity of the patterns being observed. This provides a critical degree of accuracy 
in estimated effects. 




1.2 Research Hypotheses 
Because decades of research have shown that SES-related disparities are a major factor in 
performance gaps between have and have-nots in the U.S., I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Inequities associated with key non-school factors (racial/ethnic and SES 
backgrounds) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
Additionally, because achieving the desired levels of academic proficiency can be impacted by 
relevant school factors such as location, teacher expectations, and per pupil expenditures, I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Inequities associated with key school factors (location, class size, and 
funding) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
High stakes accountability remains a central factor in the logic of education reform. 
States continue to test their students in selected subjects, publicize results, and rely on the 
results to guide policy and administrative actions in pressuring schools to improve student 
learning. The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 (NCLB) – the pinnacle of the 
standards and accountability movement – was reauthorized in 2016 as the Every Student 
Succeeds Act (ESSA) despite significant questions about improvement in student achievement. 
Because studies often focus solely on whether high stakes accountability improves 
achievement, the question of why outcomes may vary across states and over time tends to be 
neglected. Addressing reasons for variance in policy outcomes is integral to a more complete 
understanding of how to genuinely improve student learning. Non-school factors related to race 




and economics, as well as critical school factors such as location, class size, and revenue all 
influence the learning outcomes states are able to achieve.  
An analysis of these factors will show that achieving equity in education has more to do 
with addressing the social and economic disparities in our society rather than continuing to 
blame the inadequacies of an educational system that has been subject to continuous reform 
efforts for at least 150 years.  




Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
This dissertation seeks to examine whether No Child Left Behind (NCLB) achieved its 
stated purpose “to leave no child behind.” By using a novel measure, the NAEP scale 
equivalency (NSE), I analyze achievement data for fourth grade mathematics and reading from 
the key years of NCLB, 2003-2009, to determine if this reform resulted in higher levels of 
learning, as well as to uncover to what extent relevant school and non-school factors were related 
to student achievement.  
 
This study seeks to examine two key hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Inequities associated with key non-school factors (racial/ethnic and SES 
backgrounds) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
Hypothesis 2: Inequities associated with key school factors (location, class size, and 
funding) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
  
In order to examine these hypotheses and the extent to which NCLB was able to achieve 
its intended outcomes, this study relies on several key literatures. An overview of the history of 
the standards and accountability movement, including promises of increased federal funding will 
show how previous attempts at accountability had struggled to have a measurable impact. That 
relative ineffectiveness can then be sharply contrasted with the punitive approach to 
accountability characteristic of the peak years of NCLB. A review of organizational sociology 
will show that even under these impossible proficiency mandates, the states may have been 
compelled to demonstrate – in sometimes symbolic or ceremonial ways that had detrimental 
impacts on student learning – their compliance with federal law. Finally, an analysis of the non-




school and school inequities that are difficult for any system of education to overcome will 
suggest that some states have characteristics that are more likely to exert a negative influence on 
performance outcomes.  
 
2.1 History of Standards and Accountability 
The 2002 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), 
commonly referred to as No Child Left Behind (NCLB) continues to be a controversial moment 
in the history of educational reform (Darling-Hammond, 2007; Hombo, 2003). Prior to this law, 
the federal government had used funds to influence education (a state responsibility) for decades. 
Earlier educational reforms such as The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 and the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 had also introduced new standards to public education that were designed 
to support federal initiatives (Hillson, 1995; Davies, 2007). These earlier initiatives were 
accompanied with additional money to support implementation of the new programs and all were 
passed with relatively little pushback from local stakeholders (Tyack & Cuban, 1995).    
In 1965, the Johnson administration’s passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) was a controversial foray into state affairs by federal powers at that time 
(McLaughlin, 1975). Because this law attempted to build upon the promise of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and expand Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” the ESEA experienced some difficult days 
before becoming law. When it passed, those federal dollars were used to expand equal access to 
quality education, specifically for historically disadvantaged students (McLaughlin, 1975; 
Jeffrey, 1978), but accountability remained difficult to define. 
 Subsequent presidential administrations began to disparage the inadequacy of public 
education and pushed through incremental advancements without overtly threatening state and 
local control. This decades-long discourse began with the release of the Reagan Administration’s 




A Nation at Risk (Gardner, 1983). Published in the context of an ongoing Cold War with the 
Soviet Union, this report warned of the “rising tide of mediocrity” in America’s schools and tried 
to emphasize the connection between strong schools and national security. In this politically 
conservative context, the evaluation of schools had a decidedly business-like model, including 
ideas such as outputs and quality control (Sahlberg, 2011). This explosion in purpose statements 
defining what students should be learning lead to the standards movement so prevalent today; the 
corresponding ideas as to how quantifiable outcomes and achievement data could measure a 
school’s success would eventually solidify into the accountability movement (Fuhrman, 2001). 
The first Bush Administration proposed its own version of standards and accountability 
in “America 2000,” which advocated national standards, school choice through the development 
of 535 New American Schools, and alternative licensure for teachers (America 2000); however, 
in the process of gaining bipartisan support to pass this bill into law, the core provisions of 
accountability had been stripped, and schools no longer had to participate in assessments in order 
to receive the federal support (“George H. W. Bush”).  
 Similarly, the Clinton Administration tried to capitalize on the national appetite for 
“systemic reform” when it authorized the Goals 2000 legislation in 1994. This level of 
accountability made some uneasy, and both Republicans and Democrats expressed concerns over 
federal overreach. As a concession, Clinton abandoned his hopes of developing a National 
Education Standards and Improvement Council, the governing body that would have vetted the 
standards and assessments developed in each state. Consequently, “the act could not assure that 
state standards were of uniformly high quality” (“Clinton Years”). This equated to federal 
funding that required only “good faith” compliance and failed to substantively improve on the 
previous administration’s policies, still falling far short of A Nation at Risk’s demand for greater 
accountability in education.   




Nichols and Berliner (2008) argue that many of the facts and figures presented in A 
Nation at Risk were at best, flawed and at worst, misleading. However, because the 
administration had signaled that federal funds were contingent upon compliance, state-level 
policymakers responded by raising standards for teachers and students (Fuhrman, 2001). In 
response, governors commissioned studies to assess how well schools were preparing students 
(Kress et al., 2011). Within ten years, Texas, Massachusetts, and North Carolina would pass 
school accountability laws (Kress et al., 2011). By 1996, 13 states had accountability systems; by 
2000, 39 had adopted ways of measuring student growth and school effectiveness (Hanushek & 
Raymond, 2003). Despite these symbolic gestures, four presidential administrations had been 
unable to introduce lasting reform that could address the failures each had decried while on the 
campaign trail. 
 In the presidential campaign leading up to his election in 2001, then-candidate and former 
governor, George W. Bush promised to bring many of his Texas-based practices with him to 
Washington (Hayes, 2008). The failings of previous administrations were well known by the 
time he entered the Oval Office, and he found strong bipartisan will to pass the first federal 
mandate for school improvement. His closest allies, including politicians and private 
corporations who had a stake in the success of NCLB, argued that without some form of 
accountability and sanctions – including privatization of services and competitive pressures – 
there would be no incentives to address what he referred to as the “soft bigotry of low 
expectations” that was plaguing public education (Metcalf, 2002).  
 The strategy to gain support for these market-based reforms was simple. When political 
advisors were outlining an educational platform for then-candidate George W. Bush, the key 
findings of Reagan’s A Nation at Risk were still relevant and timely, and there was increased 
concern for national security and global competitiveness brought on by free-trade agreements 




and a decade of outsourcing (Hayes, 2008;). By requiring curriculum standards and assessments 
and threatening underperforming schools with the harsh, cascading public sanctions outlined in 
the bill, proponents argued that unmotivated teachers and administrators would find the impetus 
they needed to impart their subjects on students, redirect resources to support these efforts, and 
somehow become more efficient in these straight-forward technical processes of skill 
transmission and student retention (Hanushek & Raymond, 2003).  
 As has been shown, this focus on standards and accountability had a long history with 
previous presidents, so when it passed in 2002, the reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 2001 – commonly referred to as No Child Left Behind (NCLB) – 
felt a like a bipartisan political victory decades in the making. On a more practical level, it 
introduced a new era of accountability wherein failure to meet proficiency targets could result in 
punitive sanctions, both economic and organizational in nature. Under this regulatory system, all 
students were to take standardized tests, including students with special needs and second-
language learners, and a school’s future rested on its ability to demonstrate progress toward the 
goal of 100% proficiency by 2014, regardless of the challenges it faced.  
 
2.2 Accountability Under NCLB 
Public polls from 1980 indicate that “education was rated twenty-third out of forty-one 
issues. By 2000, the final year of George W. Bush’s presidential campaign, education was named 
the most important problem facing the nation” (as cited in Hayes, 2008, pp. 10).  Sponsors of 
NCLB unified popular and political consensus by capitalizing on the perception that the 
academic needs of minority students, second-language learners, and children with special needs 
were not being met (Darling-Hammond, 2007; Hayes, 2008; Hursh, 2007; Dee & Jacob, 2011). 
Proponents argued NCLB was a long-overdue response to middling academic performance and 




an attempt at satisfying the public expectation for educational excellence and equity. Building off 
the purported success of the controversial Texas system of standards, assessments, and 
outcomes, NCLB was signed into law, introducing federal provisions for testing and assessment, 
academic accountability, and the threat of corrective measures for persistently struggling schools 
(Tollefson, 2008).   
For the first time in history, federal funding of public education required that schools 
administer approved tests in English and math1 in grades 3-8 and once in high school. As a 
reauthorization of the ESEA of 1965 – the act that created Title I funds meant to improve the 
academic performance of low-income and minority students – NCLB promised to hold states 
accountable for closing the achievement gaps of minorities and other historically 
underperforming subgroups (Hursh, 2007). Consequently, the law insisted that student 
performance be disaggregated and analyzed by racial subgroups, economic indicators, second-
language learners, and students with special needs (Hayes, 2008). To mitigate complaints of 
federal overreach, the Bush administration made it clear that it had no role in setting the 
curriculum, nor would it provide a precise, uniform definition of proficiency; states were left to 
determine their benchmarks, proficiency levels and assessment instruments. Beginning in 2003, 
schools needed to show Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) toward the lofty goal of achieving 
100% student proficiency by 2014 to remain in compliance with NCLB. 
 Once students had taken their respective state assessments, the results of each school’s 
performance were made publicly available on an “Annual Report Card.” Parents, community 
members, students, and teachers would be able to see if their schools were making AYP toward 
the long-term proficiency goals. The achievement data was also reported for each of the 
 
1 Although the law also requires tests in science and social studies, controversies surrounding funding made the 
administration of these assessments inconsistent; as such, they are not considered defining aspects of the legislation.  




subgroups mentioned previously, so the public could apply pressure on schools to close the 
achievement gaps or improve the effectiveness of special programs. This public shaming of 
failing schools was based on market ideology, which endorses competition and the threat of 
consumer choice as appropriate and effective motivating factors that can turn an organization 
around – or justify its demise. Because provisions in the law allowed students of failing schools 
to “shop the market” for a higher performing school, experts argued that the fear of failure would 
motivate public educators to do what they had not yet done (Lowell, 2004; Metz, 2008; Hombo, 
2003).  
 For schools unable to make AYP or wiggle through a loophole, public, political, and 
market pressures could be applied to “compel” them to strive harder to show academic gains. 
After too many years of failing to make annual yearly progress (AYP), schools could be shut 
down or restructured under charter management or other for-profit organizations. As part of the 
NCLB legislation, schools were to reserve 20% of Title I funds to offer students the option to 
transfer to higher performing schools within the district and to pay for supplemental educational 
services (SES) from private providers free of charge (Henig, 2007; NCLB Action Brief, 2003). If 
students chose to exercise the NCLB provision for school choice, schools could use up to 15% of 
Title I funds on transportation for these students; at least 5% of title funds were designated for 
approved SES. Figure 1 summarizes the full list of cascading corrective actions for those schools 
failing to meet AYP (Manna, 2007). 
A notable element absent in the framework shown in Figure 1 are incentives for meeting 
AYP. Tyack and Cuban (1995) note the disproportionate use of “the stick” (threat of punitive 
action) versus “carrots” (incentives for achievement) in educational reform efforts. Such trends 
betray an undercurrent of distrust that has come to characterize the discourse surrounding public 
education, painting the trouble with schools as a lack of professional will rather than inequitable  




Figure 1. Sanctions for schools not meeting AYP  
Not meeting AYP Recommended Sanctions under NCLB 
First year 1. Noted in “Annual Report Card” 
2. Warning of further sanctions if AYP is not met 
Second year 1. Designated In Need of Improvement in “Annual Report Card” 
2. Parents are notified and children are offered school choice 
3. District is mandated to create PD plan to address issues 
4. 10% of Title I funds must be used on research-based PD 
Third year Penalties 1-4 carryover from previous year, plus 
5. 20% of Title I funds used for supplemental educational services 
Fourth year Penalties 1-5 carryover from previous year, plus 
6. “Corrective Action” taken: administration, schedule or curriculum 
Fifth year Penalties 1-5 carryover from previous year, plus 
7. “Restructuring Plan” must be developed and submitted to the state 
Sixth year            “Restructuring Plan” is enacted, turning the school over to charter          
             management organization, replacement of current personnel, or other  
             forms of external management or state intervention 
 
cultural capital and advantage (Lowell, 2004). As stated earlier, since the Reagan 
administration’s endorsement of A Nation at Risk in 1983, inflammatory, cautionary rhetoric has 
been used to portray the need for urgent, drastic measures and tighter controls of an inefficient 
bureaucratic institution. Sunderman, Kim and Orfield (2005) agree that effects of the policy – of 
its high-stakes, test-driven accountability – are to exert control. These punitive sanctions were 
the long and looming shadows introduced by accountability under NCLB, and these harsh 
conditions compelled schools already fighting to close the achievement gap to find new ways to 
meet these tough new federal mandates (Mathis & Trujillo, 2016). 
 
2.3 Strategic Institutional Responses 
Organizations are primarily interested in survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In order to 
continue functioning, secure a portion of the available resources, and protect the livelihood of 
those in the organization, every organization must “justify to a peer or superordinate system its 




right to exist” (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, pp. 123). This unspoken justification is called 
legitimacy, and the most common way to establish this currency is to conform to established 
values or expectations. However, decades of educational and sociological research suggest that 
genuine efforts to improve the results of public education face significant obstacles outside the 
school’s sphere of influence (Coleman, 1966). 
Symbolic compliance with organizational expectations and preserving legitimacy are 
important for organizations that are resource dependent (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Any time a 
new educational reform is introduced, this is another opportunity for schools to demonstrate their 
legitimacy (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). From the perspective of institutional survival, implementing 
reform not only satisfies legal requirements, it signals efforts to satisfy the public’s desire for 
effective and equitable schooling (Labaree, 2006). But in largely hierarchical and loosely 
coupled systems like public education, systemic change is difficult to monitor and enforce 
(Tyack, 1990). And any system of accountability that penalizes schools for poor performance 
without also acknowledging those factors that lay outside the educational sphere of control 
incentivizes a strategic response that takes precedence over bestowing the broad range of 
academic skills the standards and accountability movement is designed to promote (Bohte & 
Meier, 2000; Dobbin & Sutton, 1998).  
Schools are state-governed institutions, so NCLB had no real authority to impact 
curriculum and instruction, standardize state assessments, or define proficiency in ways that 
could have impacted the quality and level of student learning (Metz, 2008). The law was written 
without a clear and objective definition of proficiency, let alone a prescriptive set of universally 
adopted methods or instruments for measuring whether or not students were actually meeting 
these targets (Loveless, 2007). This level of ambiguity in the legal framework paved the ways for 
states to define proficiency in largely symbolic and favorable ways that made it difficult to 




ascertain whether proficiency scores were actually measuring academic improvement (Metz 
2008). Because implementation was left to each state, reform-driven changes in curriculum, 
instruction, and assessments led to differing definitions of proficiency and inconsistency from 
year to year meant to satisfy the legal requirements of the legislation (Cronin et al., 2007, 2009; 
Edelman et al., 1999).  
The locally subjective interpretation of assessment and proficiency had proven 
problematic even before NCLB in many of the states said to be pioneers in the proficiency-based 
accountability movement. In his analysis of math assessments from four different states, Porter 
(2002) found that the mean assessment-to-standard alignment was 0.40 on range of zero to one. 
In a similar study, Resnick, Rothman, Slattery and Vranek (2003) found that assessments in both 
math and reading significantly restricted the standards students were expected to master – some 
as low as 27 percent (see also, Wixson, Fisk, Dutro, & McDaniel, 2002). In all of these cases, the 
assessments exhibited wide disparities not only in the enacted curriculum (what gets taught), but 
also in the definition of proficient (the standard for student achievement) – and these realities 
limit students’ opportunities to achieve higher levels of learning (Berliner, 2009). 
Even before NCLB, high-stakes accountability had negatively impacted the students that 
should have been learning more under the spirit of this reform. Koretz and Barron (1998) found 
that teachers in Kentucky lowered standards for learning by reducing instructional time in math 
and science to dedicate more time to the tested subjects. Jacob (2002) discovered that teachers 
responded strategically to the accountability system adopted in Chicago in the 1990’s through 
exclusionary practices such as increasing special education placement and the rates of retention – 
practices which were unjust for those students whose grade-level learning was affected. Similar 
patterns of exclusion were examined in Texas, and studies there found this phenomenon 
disproportionately in the grades that test as part of the accountability system (Figlio & Getzler, 




2006; Deere & Strayer, 2001a, 2001b; Cullen & Reback, 2006).  
Perhaps it is no surprise that there is ample evidence of a wide variety of similar strategic 
(and often misleading) institutional responses during NCLB (Linn, 2003; Hornback, 2013; 
Darling-Hammond, 2007; Peterson & Hess, 2006). Although the law was intended to close the 
achievement gaps between certain subgroups, instruction was often focused on “bubble kids” – 
students who were close to demonstrating the desired proficiency levels – at the expense of other 
students’ learning (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Jennings & Sohn, 2014). Other researchers have 
documented manipulation of the testing pool either through “push out” practices that encourage 
low performers to drop out of school before the testing dates (Hursh, 2007), increased rates of 
suspension for low performing students (Figlio, 2006), or disproportionate increases in the rate 
of students identified as “disabled” who can either be exempted from taking the test or given an 
easier, modified assessment (Figlio & Getzler, 2006; Cullen & Reback, 2006). Jacobs and Levitt 
(2003) and Copeland (2013) reported the most extreme instances of teachers trying to preserve 
the legitimacy of their organizations by distributing test answers prior to the assessment or 
changing selected responses to the correct answers after students have concluded their tests.  
Multiple studies suggest that another way states complied with these institutional 
pressures for legitimacy was by inflating measures of student proficiency (Linn, Graue, & 
Sanders, 1990; Shepard, 1990; Koretz, Dunbar, & Shepard, 1991; Stecher & Barron 1998; Klein 
et. al., 2000). By arbitrarily adjusting the standards for proficiency and manipulating the 
reporting conventions, states could symbolically comply in order to maintain their standing and 
remain eligible for the external resources that would ensure their organizational survival. Such 
patterns of strategic response are often used to explain why student achievement has been slow 
to improve on low-stakes national assessments compared to the impressive proficiency gains 
reported on high-stakes state assessments (Barton & Coley, 2010; Dee & Jacob, 2011). 




Unfortunately, over-reporting percent proficient also creates the unintended consequence of 
restricting the range of skills students are being taught or are expected to master.  
In the high-stakes context of NCLB, with the threat of punitive sanctions looming 
overhead, many states found ways to meet the requirements of this federal mandate by exploiting 
the ambiguities in the law (Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger 1999; Dobbin & Sutton, 1998). These 
schools did not deliberately choose to impact students and student learning in negative ways, but 
accountability pressures, compounded with the difficulty of overcoming racial and economic 
variables, incentivized strategic and symbolic responses that allowed these systems and states to 
demonstrate their compliance with the mandates of NCLB. 
 
2.4 Understanding School and Non-school Factors  
Proficiency-based accountability lacks a thorough consideration of whether public 
schools alone have the capacity to ensure excellence and equity for all children (Mehta, 2013). 
This elusive capacity is impacted by numerous non-school and school factors that can have 
negative consequences on the ability of any actor – be it the teacher, the school, or the state – to 
improve student outcomes. Campbell's Law states that “the more any quantitative social 
indicator is used for social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures 
and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor” 
(Nichols & Berliner, 2007). In highly complex and non-standardized institutions like public 
schools, any system of accountability that fails to consider the racial and economic disparities 
that impact a student’s physical and cognitive development (Brooks-Gunn, Klebanov, & Liaw, 
1995; Guo &Harris, 2000; Votruba-Drzal, 2003), social capital (Ream & Palardy, 2008; 
Coleman, 1988), and critical attitudes (Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Davis-
Kean, 2005) in ways that make achieving high levels of academic success difficult is going to be 




subject to corruption.  
Under NCLB, states were pressured to demonstrate “proficiency” on state assessment 
regardless of the state-level school and non-school factors they were already struggling to 
overcome. At the same time, they were being told that failure to show improvement would result 
in severe penalties, up to and including government takeovers of struggling schools. Even in 
states facing challenges such as racial diversity, low SES, or systemic problems like large class 
sizes or low per pupil funding, this kind of threat incentivized a variety of institutional responses 
(Holmstrom & Milgram, 1991). In order to preserve resources and legitimacy, some actors may 
have found ceremonial and symbolic compliance – satisfying the letter of the law – easier than 
achieving the spirit of the reform. These kinds of institutional responses can be beneficial in 
terms of legal compliance, but they also hurt the very students the reform was designed to benefit 
(Berliner, 2009; Dee & Jacob, 2011; Edelman et al., 1999). This is especially true in states 
affected by key non-school and school factors that are historically difficult to overcome.  
Public schools have limited control over several non-school factors, which undermines 
their ability to guarantee high achievement for all learners. Because public policies should 
evaluate agents – in this case, states – on results these agents can meaningfully influence, 
NCLB’s plan to sanction states for failure was an ill-advised approach (Harris, 2011). In many 
cases, such undue pressure to improve student learning without regard for established and 
historical inequities prompted strategic responses that satisfied the letter of the law. In other 
words, finding ways to signal compliance with the mandates became more important than 
actually improving student learning (Bohte & Meyer, 2000; Edelman et al., 1999).  
  Non-school inequities can be considered broadly in terms of those related to 
race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status (SES). The share of underserved racial/ethnic groups in 
the state population, such as African Americans and Hispanics, is critical in this regard, because 




outcomes for children in these groups are disproportionately affected by problems outside the 
school, such as residential isolation (Sharkey & Elwert, 2011), community social disorganization 
(Wilson, 1996), poor health (Williams & Collins, 2001), low quality social services (Iglehart & 
Becerra, 2011), disenchantment with mainstream pathways to success (Mickelson, 1990), and 
discrimination (Blum, 2002). These are key obstacles to closing racial/ethnic achievement gaps 
(Barton & Coley, 2010). While low SES often intersects with racial/ethnic disadvantages, family 
economics can also be problematic in its own right (Owens, Reardon, & Jencks, 2016), 
particularly in terms of the effects of low parental income, education, and efficacy. 
Low income constrains access to materials (Mayer, 1997), extracurricular activities (Lee 
& Burkham, 2002), quality healthcare and residential facilities (Rothstein, 2004). It can also 
hinder basic endowments such as birth weight, undermining cognitive growth (Brooks-Gunn, 
Klebanov, & Liaw, 1995). These problems can be coupled with parental stress, with dire 
outcomes for child development (Guo & Harris, 2000). Moreover, low income is associated with 
exposure to neighborhoods with limited social control and negative peer groups (Sampson, 
Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002). As for low parental education, it can limit cognitive 
stimulation at home (Votruba-Drzal, 2003) and support for activities such as homework (Posner 
& Vandell, 1994). It can also undermine parental expectations for children’s performance as well 
as guidance for future success (Davis-Kean, 2005). Finally, low parental efficacy impedes school 
involvement.  
While families can support students at home, effective parenting also can bridge home 
and school, such as interacting with teachers and advocating for children’s success (Lareau and 
Horvat, 1999). This “social capital” potentially compensates for other SES disadvantages (Ream 
& Palardy, 2008), but it can be undermined by inequities in time and effort parents can allocate 
to school involvement (Rothstein, 2004), limits on parental resiliency (Amatea, Smith-Adcock, 




& Villares, 2006), and shortages in social support for parents (Hashima & Amato, 1994). In all, 
SES-related disparities are a major factor in performance gaps between haves and have-nots in 
the U.S., in some ways above and beyond racial/ethnic gaps (Reardon, 2011).  
  Ultimately, the greater the proportion of minority and/or low SES students in a state, the 
more difficult it can be for the state as a whole to improve percent proficient. This may motivate 
officials to compromise state content standards and/or narrow state assessments to facilitate 
proficiency gains (Bohte & Meyer, 2000; Edelman et al., 1999). In response, districts and 
schools serving largely minority and/or low SES students may adopt curricula narrower than 
those in other settings. Also, teachers in such settings may teach to narrow assessments more 
consistently. Given racial/ethnic and SES segregation, both within districts (Orfield & Eaton, 
1996) and increasingly between them (Clotfelter, 2004; Owens, Reardon, & Jencks, 2016), these 
curricular and instructional patterns may not limit opportunities for many white or middle-class 
students. Nonetheless, proficiency increases resulting from restriction of learning opportunities 
for minority and/or low SES students’ may help states comply with legal mandates at the same 
time these “gains” are hurting students.    
Similar dynamics can result from disparities in school quality as well. Tendencies for 
adopting narrower curricula and/or teaching to narrower assessments can be driven by 
proficiency struggles in schools lacking adequate resources and other internal features necessary 
to help raise achievement (Elmore, 2003). The first factor to consider at the state level is the 
share of students in urban and rural schools. These schools experience problems in raising 
achievement partly because they serve predominantly racial/ethnic minority and/or low SES 
students affected by greater non-school problems, a key reason why non-school disparities and 
disparities in school quality are linked. But urban and rural schools can aggravate low 
achievement in their own right, due to lack of adequate funding (Baker, Sciarra, & Farrie, 2010), 




lower teacher quality and expectations (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002), disruptive climate 
(Bryk & Schneider, 2003), and Inequities associated with key peer effects (Hanushek, Kain, & 
Rivkin, 2009).   
Another key school factor that can impact student learning is teacher-to-pupil ratio. The 
larger the size of the average classroom, the more difficult it can be for a teacher to cover a larger 
set of skills due to potentially greater variety of student needs. This increases the odds of teacher 
stress and turnover (Russell, Altmeier, & Van Velzen, 1987) and can thus impede student 
performance (Nye, Hedges, & Konstantopoulos, 2000) and complicate compliance with 
proficiency mandates.   
Finally, school quality can vary across states as a function of per pupil revenue from state 
and local (district) sources. This is a fiscal expression of state-specific capability and/or 
willingness to fund public schools (Gramlich & Rubinfeld, 1982) and is affected by the state’s 
income and wealth, as well as its emphasis on education relative to other services such as law 
enforcement, healthcare, and highways. States with lower per pupil state and local revenue spend 
less on hiring high quality teachers and provide students with lower quality programs and 
facilities (Card & Payne, 2002). They also allocate less to students whose needs cost more 
(Duncombe & Yinger, 2008). To the extent that these factors undermine achievement, they can 
stimulate skill range restriction to facilitate proficiency gains. Such patterns can be aggravated by 
failures to couple proficiency mandates with supporting funds. NCLB’s failure to provide 
sufficient funding for after-school tutoring and other supplemental services to support 
achievement has been viewed by many state and district officials as a critical obstacle to 
achieving genuine proficiency gains (Center on Education Policy, 2006, 2007).   
In states where large disparities in school quality might motivate officials to compromise 
the rigor of assessments and/or narrow the scope of curriculum to facilitate proficiency gains, 




these shifts do not have the same impact on students attending better-resourced schools. Since 
most urban and rural schools function jurisdictionally apart from their suburban counterparts, 
and since class size and per pupil revenue vary within a state, districts and schools where 
markers of low school quality are less prevalent may not limit their curricula to basic statewide 
content standards, and they may not limit instruction to skills covered by state assessments. 
Rather, to the extent that proficiency gains for the state are the result of strategic responses, these 
patterns may reflect harms endured largely by students in lower quality schools. 
 
2.5  Examining the Impact of NCLB 
What really happened to achievement in the NCLB era? Did states improve in student 
performance? How did they vary in this regard and why? What factors explain differences across 
the states and over time? These questions remain open for two reasons, both of which this 
dissertation seeks to address.  
As noted earlier, studies have lacked a proper metric for examining achievement under 
the high stakes accountability regime since assessments and curricular guidelines, as well as the 
related proficiency criteria vary across states and over time (Rothstein, 2004). The lack of a 
common and stable metric has been an obstacle in evaluating high-stakes accountability. 
Determining the true degree of progress denoted by state-reported outcomes has been a challenge 
in the absence of a common, stable frame of reference for achievement. Under the NCLB (and 
now ESSA) framework, states are required to develop their own achievement standards and 
related assessments and proficiency criteria (Loveless, 2007). But frequent changes in these 
elements complicate efforts to track progress for any given state over time (Nichols and Berliner, 
2007; Cronin, Dahlin, Xiang, & McCahon, 2009). Additionally, between-state variance prohibits 
comparative and nationwide analyses. As Mehta (2013) stresses, lack of uniformity in curricular 




guidelines, tests, and reporting practices is the most ironic feature of high-stakes accountability 
as a “test-based” national reform policy.  
A few notable studies (e.g., Dee & Jacob, 2011; Lee & Reeves, 2012) have relied on 
results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which are comparable 
across states and over time, but this approach is open to criticisms of conceptual misalignment 
with the high stakes accountability paradigm because NAEP is not a test designed for 
accountability purposes. Studies utilizing NAEP provide compelling evidence on achievement 
shortfalls under NCLB, which likely will recur under ESSA (Mathis & Trujillo, 2016). But these 
studies remain open to the criticism that NAEP is inappropriate for evaluating NCLB or any 
other accountability policy because it is not designed for accountability purposes and that the 
states do not pressure schools to improve on NAEP in the same way they pressure schools to 
improve on state tests (e.g., Popham, 2005; Phelps, 2005; Stoneberg, 2007). A state assessment 
ideally is used to detect struggling students in the state and guide remedial strategies while 
NAEP is less sensitive to these efforts as it is developed independently of state-specific problems 
and is not designed to guide remedies (Cizek, 2005). From this standpoint, discrepancies 
between NAEP and state assessment outcomes may reflect the modest success of this 
accountability policy, not its failure.  
For those who ascribe to this view, the very features of NAEP that are attractive in 
evaluating NCLB – its low-stakes, rigorous, and independent nature – represent a conceptual 
misalignment with the high-stakes accountability paradigm. Some go as far as to suggest that 
expecting significant changes in NAEP outcomes in response to a policy like NCLB is 
“antithetical” to the thinking behind NAEP because NAEP’s designers ensure that scores are 
unaffected by local curricular and instructional changes over short periods such as three, five, or 
even ten years (Popham, 2005). NAEP, it is argued, is constructed for long-term trend analysis, 




not for short-term policy evaluation. This argument implies that, despite the broad consensus on 
NCLB’s ineffectiveness, there may be a hidden virtue behind most curricular, assessment, and 
instructional decisions in the states that lead to progress in learning which NAEP cannot fully or 
properly detect. Accountability advocates argue that narrower (or more “focused”) curricula and 
assessments, and teaching to the test are essentially unproblematic if they help schools 
concentrate energies on well-defined goals for each grade level, which in the aggregate would 
benefit students (Firestone, Schorr, & Monfils, 2004). 
In this study, I utilize a novel measure that overcomes the challenges: the NAEP scale 
equivalent, or NSE, for the state-reported proficiency level. Commissioned by the National 
Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) and developed by members of the American Institutes 
for Research, this measure was created as a way to convert state-reported proficiency levels onto 
a more standardized scale. Different than a state’s raw NAEP score, the NSE is the translation of 
the state’s percent proficient (on its own assessment) to the NAEP scale based on the 
performance of students in the state’s NAEP sample, which includes students who take both the 
state assessment and NAEP. NSE enables examining not just between-state and longitudinal 
variance in achievement, but also overall (nationwide) patterns over time. Moreover, analyses 
using NSE can be adjusted for problems in converting the state’s percent proficient to the NAEP 
scale (e.g., differences in skills assessed by the state and NAEP, testing conditions, etc.).  
According to NCES, such analyses are useful for the following reasons: 
First, they allow each state to compare the stringency of its criteria for proficiency 
with that of other states. Second, mapping analyses inform states whether the 
rigor of their proficiency standards as represented by NAEP scale equivalents 
changed [over time]. Significant differences in NAEP scale equivalents might 
reflect changes in state assessments and standards and/or other changes such as 




changes in policies or practices that occurred between the years. Finally, when 
key aspects of a state’s assessment or standards remained the same, these 
mapping analyses allow NAEP to corroborate state-reported changes in student 
achievement and provide states with an indicator of the construct validity and 
generalizability of their test results. (Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, & 
McLaughlin, 2009, pp. 9) 
In the pages that follow, I will outline this theoretical framework, describe the data and 
methods utilized during the course of this dissertation, and discuss my analysis and findings. I 




















Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
3.1 Goals of this Dissertation 
This dissertation takes a critical step back to address what happened to student outcomes 
in NCLB’s peak years, from 2003 to 2009. Was the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) successful 
in accomplishing its basic goal (“to leave no child behind”)? Did states improve student 
performance? How did they vary in this regard and why? What factors explain differences across 
the states and over time?  
The central challenge in evaluating NCLB has been associated with the absence of a 
uniformly common set of outcomes across the 50 individual states, each of which was charged 
with developing its own assessment system (tests, reporting conventions, evaluation practices, 
etc.) aligned with its own statewide curricular standards. This has prohibited an overall national 
assessment as well as between-state comparisons (Rothstein, 2004). Moreover, since assessment 
systems and curricula can and do change over time, even longitudinal evaluations for the same 
states have been problematic (Cronin et al., 2007, 2009). 
In this dissertation, I will evaluate the effectiveness of NCLB by using both the state-
reported proficiency information and the results of each state’s performance on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the gold standard in educational assessment. I 
utilize a novel measure, the NAEP scale equivalency (NSE) for state-reported proficiency, before 
examining the relationship of state NSE with fundamental non-school and school factors that 
characteristically underlie achievement patterns. This approach constitutes a direct test of how 
learning outcomes were related to non-school and associated school factors, a test that no study 
to date has provided. 
 
 




3.2 NAEP Scale Equivalence (NSE) 
 In this study, I use NAEP in a novel way that transcends criticisms of earlier work relying 
on NAEP to evaluate NCLB. My approach compliments this earlier body of work. I utilize the 
NAEP scale equivalent (NSE) for percent proficient reported by the state given its own 
achievement standards (its own assessment, curricular guidelines, and proficiency criteria). NSE, 
reported in numerous federally commissioned reports (Bandeira de Mello, 2011; Bandeira de 
Mello, Blankenship, & McLaughlin, 2009; McLaughlin et al., 2008a, 2008b) is a translation of 
the state’s percent proficient to a NAEP score based on the performance of students in the state’s 
NAEP sample (the students who take both the state assessment and NAEP). Rather than denoting 
achievement on NAEP itself, NSE expresses the state-reported percent proficient as a NAEP 
score (see Table 4 in Appendix). Thus, using the NSE to examine achievement does not amount 
to using actual NAEP outcomes. It involves using the measure most pertinent to NCLB – that is, 
percent proficient – by way of converting that measure to a scale common across states and 
stable over time (the NAEP scale). 
 It is important to understand the method of converting each state-reported percent 
proficient onto the NAEP in these federally commissioned reports; the process is called 
equipercentile linking. Any time the two same subjects – whether these are the same people, 
teams, states, or students – are being assessed on different instruments, their scores can be 
translated onto the other assessments, even if the two assessments do not have any substantive or 
topical relationships (Holland, 2007; Dorans & Holland, 2007). For example, imagine that ten 
students take an assessment over American History, and the same ten students measure their 
shoe sizes and chart the distribution for the results of each assessment. Although the results of 
American History exam and distribution of shoe sizes have nothing to do with one another, 
because the same ten students took both, the results of one assessment can be translated to the 




other assessment using these score distributions. If 70% of the students tested pass the American 
History assessment, that distribution, along with the cut score establishing the 70% pass rate in 
this example, can be placed onto the results of the distribution of responses for the student’s shoe 
sizes. Although this equipercentile linking can be done, the translation will produce a relative 
error, which is an estimate of this conversion problem. In this example, the conversion of scores 
will have a relative error of 1, showing that a comparison of these results is not valid because the 
substantive connections of what is being measured are not related in any way (Thissen & 
Wainer, 2001).  
NSE is constructed by mapping – through equipercentile linking – percent proficient on 
the state assessment onto the NAEP score distribution in the same sample (Feuer, Holland, 
Green, Bertenthal, & Hemphill, 1999;  Braun & Qian, 2007). For each tested grade level, a state’s 
NAEP sample includes nearly 2,500 students from about 100 schools that are representative of 
the state.i  Because these assessments are dealing with the same population – namely, the 2500 
students who took both the NAEP and the state assessment – and because the NAEP sample is 
rigorously constructed to be representative of state-level characteristics, equipercentile linking is 
applied here to translate percent proficient to the NAEP score to produce the NSE, as has been 
done in multiple federal studies (Bandeira de Mello, 2011; Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, & 
McLaughlin, 2009; McLaughlin et al., 2008a, 2008b). Because the populations are the same, and 
because percent proficient and the NAEP are both established measures of academic skills such 
as reading and mathematics, this methodology is not only practically accomplishable, it is 
substantively meaningful. 
 The procedure involves broadly two steps, which can be addressed in reference to State 
A in Figure 2. First, the percentage of students in the state’s NAEP sample who are proficient on  
 




Figure 2: A stylized depiction of mapping percent proficient onto the NAEP 
 
 
the state assessment is determined based on State A’s proficiency criteria, resulting in 70 percent 
as shown by the curve on the left. This percentage mirrors proficiency in the entire state given 
the representativeness of the NAEP sample. Next, a cut point on the NAEP score distribution in 
State A’s NAEP sample is identified that provides a proportion equal to percent proficient on the 
state assessment, resulting in an NSE, shown as 185 under the curve on the right for State A (for 
more detail, see Braun & Qian, 2007; Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, & McLaughlin, 2009). 




Comparing State A and State B illustrates how two states with the same percent proficient may 
have different NSEs (175 for State B), given differences in respective NAEP score distributions. 
Also, as in the case of State C, a lower percent proficient (60 percent) may map onto a higher 
NSE (195). And a higher percent proficient may map onto a lower NSE (not shown in figure). 
Finally, the same state’s NSE may change over time depending on changes in the state’s 
achievement standards and/or its NAEP score distribution. While state assessments, curricular 
guidelines, and proficiency criteria vary across states and over time, the stable, nationwide, and 
rigorous nature of NAEP offers a robust frame of reference for converting state-reported 
proficiency outcomes to a cross-sectionally and longitudinally common metric. NAEP remained 
essentially unchanged from 2002 to 2010, NCLB’s peak years, on which I focus (see Dee & 
Jacob, 2011; Jacob, 2007; Kolstad, 2002).   
The unique advantage of the NSE is that expresses percent proficient on a common 
metric, regardless of differences in assessment systems across states or over time. This is because 
(1) NAEP content and practices remain stable over time (Hombo, 2003; Yeager, 2007), and (2) 
the percent proficient is taken as “state-reported” regardless of state assessment content, cut 
score, and curricular alignments. That means NSE is a robust conversion of whatever a state 
itself says its proficiency outcome is for a given year and grade level under the NCLB regime, 
not an outcome that is pedagogically or operationally unrelated (or loosely related) to NCLB.  
The procedure to construct NSE also produces a “relative error” in mapping percent 
proficient onto the NAEP scale. This error is critical with regard to the “substantive” validity of 
the mapping. Any two distributions can be equipercentally linked when they are common to the 
same students, but distributions may differ in terms of the substantive content area they 
represent. Recall the hypothetical example using equipercentile linking to equate the results of 
the American History exam with the distribution of the same students’ shoe sizes. The results of 




one assessment can be translated to the other assessment using their respective distributions, 
even though the assessments have nothing to do with one another. Relative error varies from 0 to 
1, where 1 indicates total invalidity for the mapping. In this hypothetical example of American 
History and shoe size, the relative error would be 1; the conversion is accomplishable, but it is 
completely meaningless. 
Linking is fully appropriate when the assessed skills are the same but the scales are 
different (e.g., inches versus centimeters). Since NAEP measures an amalgamation of skills 
students are expected to learn in all states, the skills it addresses are never exactly the same as the 
skills evaluated by any given state assessment, which focuses on a narrower set of skills in light 
of local curricular standards and preferences. Thus, the conversion of percent proficient to the 
NAEP scale is never fully valid. The relative error (RE) in mapping is an estimate of this 
conversion problem. It is based on how well the NSE can reproduce percent proficient in 
individual NAEP schools (for details, see Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, & McLaughlin, 
2009). Every one of these conversions will produce a relative error, but it will never be 1, 
because this conversion is substantively meaningful because both assessments are of academic 
skills. Similarly, the RE will never be 0 because the skills assessed on the NAEP are too broad 
for any state assessment – let alone curriculum – to cover all that the NAEP measures. The RE 
for these conversions will always be between 0 and 1. 
In the broad testing context of high stakes assessments and the NAEP, factors such as 
differences in student motivation regarding the two tests, in time of test administration (the 
month), and in-test format (e.g., open-ended versus multiple-choice questions) can also 
contribute to the conversion problem in limited degrees (Feuer et al., 1999), each producing a 
relative error. As described below, I use the inverse of the RE (i.e., 1/RE as the basis for 
observation weights in my estimation, such that observations involving NSEs with greater 




mapping errors are weighted down while those with smaller mapping errors are weighted up. 
This provides a critical degree of accuracy in estimated effects.  
 
3.3. Data Measures 
My analysis addresses effects on NSE for fourth grade proficiency in math and reading, 
between 2003 and 2009. I rely on a state-level panel dataset with two-year intervals starting in 
2003, resulting in four time points (n=50x4=200). As noted above, NSE information for states is 
available in federally commissioned reports (Bandeira de Mello, 2011; Bandeira de Mello, 
Blankenship, & McLaughlin, 2009; McLaughlin et al., 2008a, 2008b). I obtained corresponding 
yearly non-school data for each state from American Community Survey (ACS), which reports 
various state means for adults, ages 30 to 50.ii It is critical to note that I deliberately limited my 
predictors to an essential set of state features even though more variables are available. Because 
basic characteristics at the state level tend to be strongly correlated and operationally redundant, 
my study focuses on those school and non-school factors the existing literature suggests would 
have a strong impact on student achievement.   
Racial demographics came from the American Community Survey (ACS) data, and were 
separated into the two largest minority groups: percent African American (RACE) and percent 
Hispanic (HISPANIC). As mentioned in the literature review, academic outcomes for these 
populations are disproportionately affected by a variety of non-school factors (see Sharkey and 
Elwert, 2011; Wilson, 1996; Williams & Collins, 2001; Iglehart & Becerra, 2011; Mickelson, 
1990; Blum, 2002) that represent significant obstacles to closing racial/ethnic achievement gaps 
(Barton & Coley, 2010).  
Data regarding percent poor in the state (POVERTY), was also taken from the American 
Community Survey (ACS). Socio-economic disadvantages often overlap racial and ethnic 




divides, but lower SES can present problems regardless of race and ethnicity (Owens, Reardon, 
& Jencks, 2016).  Low income not only limits access to opportunities (Mayer, 1997; Lee & 
Burkham, 2002; Rothstein, 2004), but can also have negative effects on healthy physical and 
cognitive development (Brooks-Gunn, Klebanov, & Liaw, 1995; Guo & Harris, 2000; Votruba-
Drzal, 2003). Children who grow up in lower SES are also negatively impacted by the attitudes 
within these environments (Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Davis-Kean, 2005). 
Obviously, these economic and environmental factors can contribute to circumstances that 
negatively impact student achievement. 
Similarly, the percent of single parent homes (MARST>1 and NCHILD>0) in each state 
was also obtained from the American Community Survey. Invested parents can be considered to 
possess a kind of “social capital” that can help mitigate other SES disadvantages (Ream & 
Palardy, 2008), but such potential advantages can be undermined by inequities in time and effort 
parents can allocate to school involvement (Rothstein, 2004). This limited capacity for 
involvement is a characteristic of lower SES neighborhoods, and these economic disadvantages 
are critical non-school factors that should be understood (Reardon, 2011).  
Conversely, having at least one parent with a college degree can not only improve the 
student’s chances of academic success, but that experience endows its own “social capital” that 
can improve the parent’s and student’s abilities to advocate in ways that support academic 
success. For these reasons, this study also looks at percent of adults (ages 30-50) with college 
degree (EDUC).  
 Data on school factors were obtained from the federal Common Core of Data (CCD). The 
first measure taken from the CCD was percent of students in urban and rural districts (ULOCAL) 
Not only do these schools serve more racially and economically disadvantaged students than 
suburban schools do, they often have a host of systemic problems that present challenges to 




achieving at high levels (see Baker, Sciarra, & Farrie, 2010; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; 
Bryk & Schneider, 2003; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2009).   
Also taken from CCD, average class size is another school factor that can exert a 
significant impact on one’s education. Studies show that large class sizes contribute to teacher 
stress and turnover (Russell, Altmeier, & Van Velzen, 1987) which can have negative 
consequences on academic outcomes (Nye, Hedges, & Konstantopoulos, 2000). In this study of 
fourth grade math and reading, the mean pupil/teacher ratio in elementary school is used as a 
proxy measure for class size so that the effects of this environmental condition can be analyzed. 
Because school quality is somewhat dependent on the availability of financial resources, I 
also obtained per pupil state and local revenue ((TSREV+TLOCREV)/MEMBER) from the 
CCD. Lower state and local revenue has implications for recruitment, hiring, and retention of 
teachers, quality of programs and facilities (Card & Payne, 2002), and on the availability and 
effectiveness of student supports (Duncombe &Yinger, 2008). Table 1 offers a full explanation 
of the measures used in this dissertation.  
 
3.4 Analytical approach 
Although each state (50) is being observed four times (2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009), 
there are constants within each state that remain unchanged. In longitudinal datasets that 
observe the same unit over time, these unit-specific constants “color” the other variables in 
ways that keep each of the four state-level observations from being truly independent. In order 
to limit the effects of this, I used hierarchical linear regression. This approach limits biases 
related to non-independence of repeated observations of the same unit.  




Table 1: Measures used in the analysis 
 
Note: CWI (comparable wage index) is a measure of cost of living, reflecting regional variations in salaries of college graduates who are not educators. It enables 
robust comparisons of income and other fiscal measures across different geographic locations. Measures from the American Community Survey (ACS) are 
weighted averages constructed using the person weight variable (PERWT). 




I fit the following models using the xtmixed procedure in STATA 14.2 separately for fourth 
grade math and reading: 
NSEjt = β0j + β1jt + β2jt
2 + εjt        (1a) 
β0j=λ00 + Σi=1(ψ0iSijt) + υ0j               (1b) 
β1j=λ10 + Σi=1(ψ0iSijt) + υ1j              (1b) 
NSEjt is the NAEP scale equivalent for percent proficient for state j in year t, where t=0 for 2003, 
t=1 for 2005, t=2 for 2007, and t=3 for 2009. This coding facilitates interpretation of time 
interactions of predictors (see “Results” chapter for a further explanation). Sijt is the i
th state 
characteristic where the series i runs from 1 to 8 (see figure 3) for state j in year t. Equation 1b 
represents main effects of state characteristics, while equation 1b specifies the interactions of 
those characteristics with time (since this equation is a level-2 specification for β1j, the t 
coefficient at level-1). Notice that I also account for nonlinear time effects at level-1 (β2jt
2).  
 
Figure 3: Measures – i series state characteristics, 1-8 
Number Measure Code Source 
1 Percent African American RACE ACS 
2 Percent Hispanic HISPANIC ACS 
3 Percent poor POVERTY ACS 
4 Percent college graduate EDUC ACS 
5 Percent single parent (MARST>1 and NCHILD>0) ACS 
6 Percent urban and rural ULOCAL CCD 
7 Pupil/teacher ratio in elementary 
grades 
 CCD 
8 Per pupil state and local revenue (TSREV+TLOCREV)/MEMBER CCD 
 
Most importantly, as noted earlier, the relative error (RE) in generating the NSE is used 
as the basis for observational weights in estimation. For each state-by-year observation, the 
weight is specified as 1/RE, the inverse of the relative error, consistent with insights from the 
8 
8 




conventional literature on inverse variance weighting. The RE is essentially a variance measure 





















Chapter 4: Results 
This study set out to examine whether No Child Left Behind (NCLB) achieved its stated 
purpose “to leave no child behind.” By using a novel measure, the NAEP scale equivalency 
(NSE), I analyzed achievement data for fourth grade mathematics and reading from the key years 
of NCLB, 2003-2009, to determine if this reform resulted in higher levels of learning and to 
examine the effects of relevant school and non-school factors historically correlated to student 
achievement. In this chapter I will discuss the results of the two hypotheses posed in this 
dissertation: 
Hypothesis 1: Inequities associated with key non-school factors (racial/ethnic and SES 
backgrounds) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
Hypothesis 2: Inequities associated with key school factors (location, class size, and 
funding) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
 
4.1 Analysis: Fourth Grade Mathematics 
Estimated effects on NSE are shown in Table 2. In Model 1, for mathematics, I entered 
predictors without time interactions. Thus, each effect shown in this model reflects the aggregate 
effect of that particular (school or non-school) factor’s relationship with NSE across all four time 
points (2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009). In this model, percent African American is the only state 
feature significantly related to NSE: a standard deviation increase in percent African American is 
related to -0.325 (p≤0.050) standard deviation units of decrease in that state’s NSE. This model 
is helpful because when the effects of time are taken out, only one non-school factor – percent 
African American – is statistically significant, at -0.325 (p≤0.050). Model 1 is represented 
below. 





In Model 2, I introduce time interactions to test whether effects vary across the key years 
of NCLB: 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. When measured this way, the main effect of race loses 
the strength of its significance (-0.041, p≥0.100), but this effect is only for 2003 (t=0). In other 
words, the negative effects were less negative, less statistically significant, and less perceptible 
when observed over this single unit of time as compared to Model 1. However, the interaction of 
percent African American (RACE) with time is strongly significant (-0.192, p≤0.050). This 
means that for each consecutive time point after 2003, the effect of percent African American on 
fourth grade math proficiency became increasingly negative. Recall that t=1 for 2005, t=2 for 
2007, and t=3 for 2009. These calculations for each consecutive time period reveal more trends 
that should inform any analysis of NCLB and its attempts at accountability.  
 
In Model 2, the estimated effect of percent African Americans in 2003 is -0.233 (i.e., 
0.041+(1*-0.192)); for 2005: -0.425 (i.e., -0.041+(2*-0.192)); and for 2007: -0.617 (i.e., -
0.041+(3*-0.192)). This demonstrates that although the main effect of race in Model 2 for the 
year 2003 (-0.041, p≥0.100) is statistically weaker than the effect measured in Model 1 (-0.325, 
p≤0.050), by the end of the decade a one unit (STD) increase in African Americans results in a 
decrease in NSE (-0.617, p≤0.050), more than one-half of one standard deviation. To clarify, 
Model 1: Fourth Grade Mathematics (aggregate - no time interactions) 
NSE = -0.325 RACE (African American) 
 
Model 2: Fourth Grade Mathematics (with time interactions) 
2003: NSE = -0.041 RACE – 0.168 POV + 0.000 ULOCAL +0.530 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
2005: NSE = -0.233 RACE – 0.168 POV – 0.120 ULOCAL +0.367 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
2007: NSE = -0.425 RACE – 0.168 POV – 0.240 ULOCAL +0.204 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
2009: NSE = -0.617 RACE – 0.168 POV – 0.360 ULOCAL +0.041 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
 
 




having more African Americans in any state between the years 2003-2009 resulted in a NAEP 
scale equivalency that continued to decline over time. Regardless of these state-level trends in 
self-reported percent proficient (which will be discussed below), the NAEP scale equivalence of 
these states with a high percent of African American students demonstrate that the standards for 
meeting state-defined proficiency were less rigorous at the end of the reform than they were at 
the beginning. Since NCLB was designed to ensure that all students were achieving at high 
levels, regardless of their location or background, this empirical evidence of decline is 
fundamentally antithetical to the spirit of the reform – and a direct contradiction of George W. 
Bush’s stated goal to “end the soft bigotry of low expectations.”  
Model 2 also shows that the effect of location (percent urban/rural = ULOCAL) is time 
dependent. In 2003 (the main effect), location had no relationship with NSE (0.000, p≥0.100), 
but for each consecutive time point, the effect of percent urban/rural students became 
increasingly negative (-0.120, p≤0.050). Similar to the analysis of percent African American, this 
highlights the value of both models: although in Model 1 the effects of percent urban/rural were 
not significant, when observed over time this important school-related factor is correlated with a 
decrease in the NSE. As explained above, this means that in states with more students attending 
urban and rural schools, the actual benchmark to meet proficiency targets was lower at the end 
of the reform than it was at the beginning, leaving students who attended schools in often-already 
disadvantaged and under-resourced communities to a lower standard than they were before this 
accountability-based reform was initiated.   
Finally, the effect of funding (per pupil state/local revenue = (TSTREV+TLOCAL) 
/MEMBER)) became increasingly less positive over time. In 2003 (the main effect), per pupil 
revenue had a positive interaction with time (0.530, p≤0.010), which meant that for this year, the 




Table 2. Weighted HLM estimates of effects on NAEP scale equivalent (NSE) for percent 








Table 2. Continued  
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are based on standardized scores. *** p≤0.010, ** p≤0.050, * 
p≤0.100. 
 
more money a state spent per pupil, that was strongly correlated to a high NSE. Despite this 
positive impact measured in 2003, the effect of funding decreased by -0.120 (p≤0.050) in each 
subsequent time point.  
 Although much was made of NCLB being an “unfunded mandate” (Lowell, 2004; 
Mathis, 2005), there are a few possible explanations for why per pupil expenditures had a less 
positive impact over time. Because in an accountability-based system, outcomes – in this case 
learning, skills, or concepts – are standardized, the individual actors within these systems may 
have become more proficient at communicating, transmitting, and measuring these desired 
outcomes. As the state actors became more skilled in this new educational context, that increased 
capacity may have resulted in funding became less consequential.  
 In a similar vein, because learning outcomes are standardized under this kind of reform, 
states with lower per pupil expenditures may have improved how they satisfied the 
requirements of this reform over time. The longer these lower revenue states operated under and 
became familiar with the system, the more they increased their capacity to achieve the letter of 




the law. Because Model 2 shows interactions over time, these states might have, in essence, 
been “gaining” on states that had historically higher per pupil revenue, effectively diminishing 
the effect of funding on each state’s ability to demonstrate their compliance with the mandate.  
 
4.2 NCLB’s Impact: Fourth Grade Mathematics 
 With regard to dissertation hypothesis 1, Inequities associated with key non-school 
factors (racial/ethnic and SES backgrounds) are negatively related to learning outcomes under 
NCLB, the results of the Model 1 and Model 2 analysis clearly show that the effects of race on 
fourth grade math proficiency were not only significant in the aggregate (-0.325, p≤0.050), but 
that this factor became increasingly deleterious over time. Because NCLB was designed to result 
in higher levels of learning for all students by raising the expectations and outcomes for 
historically disadvantaged students, this pattern is fundamentally antithetical to NCLB’s 
objectives and to purposes of proficiency-based accountability reform more generally. 
 My first hypothesis also suggested that another critical non-school factor, percent of 
poverty in the state, would also have a negative impact on NSE. Model 1 does not pick up any 
effect of poverty on a state’s NSE in the aggregate, and although it is detectable in Model 2, it 
does not vary in strength as it interacts with time, remaining constant at -0.168 (p≥0.100). 
Although this is counter to the assumptions I made in my research hypothesis 1, the effects of 
race on the NSE clearly demonstrate that, in total, NCLB’s effect on fourth grade mathematics 
may have hurt the very students it was officially designed to help. 
 Turning to dissertation hypothesis 2, Inequities associated with key school factors 
(location, class size, and funding) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB, 
Models 1 and 2 make clear that the key school factors indicated in the existing literature such as 
percent urban/rural and per pupil state and local revenue do have implications for a state’s NSE, 




although not as predicted.  In terms of fourth grade mathematics, percent urban/rural had an 
increasingly negative effect over time, while the effect of per pupil funding had a (2003) main 
effect (0.530, p≤0.010) that as increasingly less positive over time. Although hypothesis 2 also 
predicted class size would have a negative impact on learning outcomes under NCLB, as 
measured by a negative impact on NSE over time, this effect did not show up in Model 1 or 
Model 2. However, because NCLB was intended to level the playing field by ensuring that 
students in disadvantaged and under-resourced schools were learning at the same high levels as 
many of their better-funded suburban counterparts, this results of this study show that in terms of 
overcoming well-documented school factors that have historically presented obstacles to 
learning, NCLB did not achieve its stated purpose.  
 
4.3 Analysis: Fourth Grade Reading 
Models 3 and 4 address effects on NSE for fourth grade reading. They replicate the same 
specification procedure as in Models 1 and 2. Model 3 is represented below.  
 
As seen in the calculation, percent urban/rural (-0.273, p≤0.010) and pupil/teacher ratio (a 
proxy for class size) (-0.233, p≤0.010) undermined reading proficiency, while per pupil 
state/local revenue improved it. Unlike the results for my analysis of fourth grade mathematics in 
either Model 1 or 2, percent African American does not present as a significant factor in NSE for 
fourth grade reading when studied in the aggregate, 2003-2009. But these effects are longitudinal 
aggregates, and much like the earlier analysis showed, that is the value of Models 1 and 3; with 
the effects of time removed, the results can be quite different than the effects of critical school 
Model 3: Fourth Grade Reading (aggregate - no time interactions) 
NSE = -0.273 ULOCAL – 0.233 PT/RATIO + 0.332 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   




and non-school factors as measured when they interact with time; these interactions are broken 
down in Model 4.  
 
Unlike in Model 3 where the effect was not at all significant, Model 4 shows that the 
percent of African American students in a state had an increasingly negative effect on the NSE  
(-0.161, p≤0.50) of fourth grade reading over time. This is a critical point because although the 
effects were almost undetectable in the aggregate, by the end of the decade in 2009, a one-unit 
increase (STD) in percent African Americans would have a -0.430 (p≤0.50) decrease in NAEP 
scale equivalency.  
While Model 3 suggests that percent urban/rural negatively impacted NSE, Model 4 
shows that this factor loses significance in terms of both its (2003) main effect (-0.147, p≤0.100) 
and its interaction with time (-0.080, p≥0.100). This simply suggests that while the location 
effect is strongly negative in the aggregate, its size in any given year is not large enough to be 
statistically significant. In contrast, the effect of pupil/teacher ratio on fourth grade reading 
outcomes became increasingly negative over time. While its (2003) main effect is non-
significant, its interaction with time is strongly negative (-0.185, p≤0.010). There are a few 
possible explanations as to why under the exact same proficiency-based reform, this school 
factor would impact reading more than it did mathematics.  
Math skills are segmented and sequentially ordered (Reys et al., 2014). Because of this 
inherent structure, students can be good in some grade-appropriate mathematics without 
Model 4: Fourth Grade Reading (with time interactions) 
2003: NSE = 0.053 RACE – 0.147 ULOCAL + 0.096 PT/RATIO + 0.883 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
2005: NSE = -0.108 RACE – 0.147 ULOCAL - 0.089 PT/RATIO + 0.606 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
2007: NSE = -0.269 RACE – 0.147 ULOCAL - 0.274 PT/RATIO + 0.329 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
2009: NSE = -0.430 RACE – 0.147 ULOCAL – 0.459 PT/RATIO + 0.052 (TSTREV+TLOCAL)/MEMBER   
 




performing well in other ones. For instance, in eighth grade, a student may have exceptional 
geometry skills while struggling to understand basic statistics. Because the skills in math can be 
taught in isolation or in ways that can be logically scaffolded for students, math instruction is 
easier to standardize in large group settings. When students require remediation, the objective 
nature and standardized processes characteristic of math make it easier for a teacher to diagnose 
and address a variety of learner needs within one class. 
Reading proficiency, on the other hand, is dependent on a greater number of nuanced 
skills that are far more subjective in nature and that occur simultaneously in the act of reading 
fluently. To read proficiently, students need to understand orthography and phonology 
(Alexander & Fox 2013; Dresser 2012), have the ability to decode (Smith, 1985), apply 
contextual interpretation of meanings (Adams, 2103), as well as actively practice comprehension 
and inference-making (Vacca & Vacca, 2005). Because of the “nested” and interdependent skills 
required of proficient readers, it can be much more difficult to diagnose and address skill 
deficiencies that students exhibit. These complications may explain why both Models 3 and 4 
reveal that a greater pupil/teacher ratio (a proxy for class size) has a larger impact on fourth 
grade reading instruction than it does on fourth grade mathematics.  
And finally, while the effect of per pupil state/local revenue was strongly positive in 2003 
(0.883, p≤0.010), it became increasingly less positive over time (-0.277, p≤0.010). Potential 
explanations for this decreasing impact of funding were explained above (see section 4.1)   
 
4.4 NCLB’s Effect: Fourth Grade Reading 
 My first research hypothesis states that, Inequities associated with key non-school factors 
(racial/ethnic and SES backgrounds) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
Although not statistically significant in Model 3, the analysis in Model 4 demonstrate that the 




critical non-school factor of racial diversity – specifically, percent African American in the state 
– has a positive (2003) main effect (0.053, p≤0.050), but that it is affected by an increasingly 
negative effect in subsequent years (-0.161, p≤0.050). Unlike I hypothesized, states with high 
percentages of low-income families did not impact the NSE over time. However, the analysis of 
both fourth grade reading and fourth grade mathematics show that increases in percent African 
American students has a deleterious consequence on these state’s respective NAEP scale 
equivalence. Because it did not live up to its promise of closing the achievement gap for these 
students of color, instead lowering the real benchmark for states to demonstrate their proficiency 
(as measured by the decrease in NSE over time), NCLB clearly negatively impacted learning 
outcomes for African American students.  
 The second hypothesis I forwarded in this dissertation suggests that, Inequities associated 
with key school factors (location, class size, and funding) are negatively related to learning 
outcomes under NCLB. While the school-related variable of location (defined as percent 
urban/rural) had a negative effect on fourth grade reading proficiency in aggregate in the 2003-
2009 period  (-0.273, p≤0.010), the effect size when interacting with time did not show up as 
statistically significant in Model 4; again, this highlights the value of running two models of 
analysis, one in the aggregate (2003-2009) and one that breaks down these effects as they 
interact with time. From the peak years of NCLB, 2003-2009, the impact class size had on NSE 
became increasingly more negative during every period (-0.185, p≤0.010). When observed by 
the end of Model 4, a one unit (STD) increase in pupil/teacher ratio results in nearly one-half of 
one standard deviation decline in NSE for fourth grade reading. That effect makes clear that 
larger class sizes made teaching reading a more difficult endeavor, and the NSE over time 
suggests that actual student outcomes suffered under these conditions.  




 Finally, money became less beneficial over time with regard to reading proficiency, as 
was the case with math. As explained previously, this probably had to do with the 
standardization of expectations and individual actors’ increasing familiarity with and capacity to 
achieve these outcomes. Taken as a whole, it is clear that school-level factors such as class size 
and location had negative consequences on the levels of learning being measured on those state’s 
respective assessments as measured when these are mapped onto the NAEP. For this reason, it is 
clear that No Child Left Behind did not improve the educational achievement of all students, but 
rather resulted in symbolic compliance that satisfied the letter of the law without benefitting the 
very students it was intended to help.  
 As an auxiliary analysis, I examined the relationship of all these predictors with state-
reported percent proficient (unconverted to the NAEP scale), relying on the same modeling 
approach as above. My findings are shown in Table 3 below. 
 This is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates how conclusions based on raw 
proficiency information will be different than those based on the NSE for proficiency. And 
second, based on the nature and magnitude of differences, one can infer how distorted state-
reported proficiency information can be under the proficiency-based accountability regime, 
which ultimately undermines the entire reform.  
 As seen across all four models in Table 3, no state feature – school or non-school -  
statistically predicts percent proficient as reported by the state. Time is the only significant 
predictor in virtually all models. This suggest that states reported better proficiency regardless of 
differences in key non-school and school factors that are well known to influence performance. 
The average state-reported fourth grade reading proficiency steadily increased over time (as all 
 




Table 3. HLM estimates of effects on percent proficient in fourth grade math and reading, 2003-
2009 
 




Table 3. Continued  
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are based on standardized scores. *** p≤0.010, ** p≤0.050, 
*p≤0.100. 
  
   
rate of increase (as all second-order time effects [Time2] are modestly negative and significant at 
p≤0.010).  
This pattern is consistent with insights from classic studies of compliance with legal 
mandates (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). When a reform is legally mandated, all actors subject to the 
mandate are coerced to comply. Individual traits are inconsequential in time and degree of 
compliance in terms of official deliverables, whether these involve symbolic responses or 
genuine ones. For example, all drivers, regardless of personal traits, are expected to comply with 
speed limits. Coercive compliance in this regard is different from normative and mimetic 
processes where characteristics and needs of complying actors play a greater role in time and 
degree of compliance with the law (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  
Under the proficiency-based accountability regime, all states are obligated to improve 
proficiency, irrespective of their characteristics. Hence, no state characteristic predicts 
proficiency outcomes. But the NSE analysis in Table 2 reveals that effects on patterns of learning 




were very different than those estimated based on state-reported percent proficient information as 




























Chapter 5: Discussion 
This dissertation takes a critical step back to address what happened to student outcomes 
in NCLB’s peak years, from 2003 to 2009: Was the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) successful 
in accomplishing its basic goal (“to leave no child behind”)? Did states improve student 
performance? How did they vary in this regard and why? What factors explain differences across 
the states and over time?  
In this dissertation, I set out to evaluate the effectiveness of NCLB by using both the state-
reported proficiency information and the results of each state’s performance on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) using equipercentile linking (see Figure 2). By using 
the NAEP scale equivalency (NSE) for state-reported proficiency (see Table 4 in Appendix), this 
study looks at fourth grade mathematics and reading in order to analyze the relationship of state 
NSE with fundamental non-school and school factors that characteristically underlie 
achievement patterns.  
Because decades of research have shown that SES-related disparities are a major factor in 
performance gaps between have and have-nots in the U.S., I hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 1: Inequities associated with key non-school factors (racial/ethnic and SES 
backgrounds) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
Additionally, because achieving the desired levels of academic proficiency can be impacted by 
relevant school factors such as location, teacher expectations, and per pupil expenditures, I 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2: Inequities associated with key school factors (location, class size, and 
funding) are negatively related to learning outcomes under NCLB. 
 
 




5.1 Key Findings  
Campbell’s Law is Strong 
Campbell's Law states that “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social 
decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to 
distort and corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor” (Nichols and Berliner, 2007). 
Under the structure of NCLB, states were not only forced to find a way to 100% proficiency by 
the end of 2014, but they were threatened with a series of cascading punitive sanctions if they 
failed to show improvement, without regard or mercy for any significant school-related or non-
school factors that have been proven to negatively impact academic achievement.  
According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, one of the purposes of 
analyses utilizing the NSE is to “inform states whether the rigor of their proficiency standards as 
represented by NAEP scale equivalents changed [over time]. Significant differences in NAEP 
scale equivalents might reflect changes in state assessments and standards and/or other changes 
such as changes in policies or practices that occurred between the years” (Bandeira de Mello, 
Blankenship, & McLaughlin, 2009, pp. 9).  
NCLB was a federal mandate with a cascading menu of punitive sanctions for states that 
failed to comply. Although Table 3 shows that state-reported proficiency rates are impressive 
and improve steadily over time, Table 2 reveals that these state-reported gains were actually 
distorted in ways that had negative consequences for the very students the reform was intended 
to benefit. In states facing challenges such as racial diversity (defined as a high percent of 
African American residents), or that have systemic problems like a large number of communities 
located in an historically under-resourced urban or rural locations, or large class sizes, the 
standard for proficiency did not increase as NCLB had intended. Additionally, because the legal 




mandates of this reform required compliance from all actors regardless of school or non-school 
factors, even per pupil revenue did not improve a state’s ability to improve student achievement 
over time.  
Instead, as Campbell’s Law predicts, the pressure to show continued gains year after year 
lead to a corruption of the intended outcome (Nichols and Berliner, 2007; Holmstrom and 
Milgram, 1991). Although the states reported ever-increasing levels of proficiency, students in 
these states achieved less, year after year. When viewed through the lens of established 
principles of organizational sociology such as resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
organizational legitimacy (Tyack & Cuban, 1995), and goal displacement (Bohte & Meier, 
2000), one could conclude that states already facing disadvantages due to established non-school 
and school inequities responded in largely symbolic ways.  
Because the unit of analysis in this student is the state, the results do not allow 
conclusions to be drawn on any units smaller than that. Without further investigation, it is 
difficult to conclude whether these changes in the NSE were due to strategic gaming (Linn et al., 
1990; Shepard, 1990; Koretz et al., 1991; Stecher & Barron 1998; Klein et. al. 2000) or were 
motivated by organizational survival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Either way, it is clear that the real standard for student proficiency in these states diminished 
over time, and diminished at statistically significant rates in states with large percentages of 
African American students and students attending urban and rural schools.  
 
NCLB Failed 
Although that section heading might seem harsh and absolute, my analysis of the effects 
of school and non-school factors on the NSE for fourth grade mathematics and reading very 




clearly show that this policy did not, as President George W. Bush suggested it would, “end the 
soft bigotry of low expectations.” In fact, the only significant predictors of lower NSE for both of 
these academic subjects was percent African American within the state. This means that over 
time, although states with large populations of African American students continued to show 
improvements in state-reported proficiency (see Table 3) to signal their compliance with the 
federal mandate, when those same state-reported proficiency rates were mapped onto the NAEP 
for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009, the real benchmark to achieve proficiency continued 
to decline over time.  
Again, because the state is the smallest unit of analysis, it is impossible to say whether 
the deleterious effects of each respective coefficient (African American or urban/rural schools) 
affected only these students, or whether or not the disproportionate percentages of these factors 
within these states had the effect of holding down the expectations for all students, especially 
since state assessments and cut scores are determined by state departments of education. What 
can be seen, whether intentional or not, is that the declining rigor of assessments in these states 
suggests that already disadvantaged students were even more “left behind” as a result of the 
policy.  
Although critics could argue that the states could have been more successful had NCLB 
not been an “unfunded mandate,” per pupil expenditures had less of positive impact over the life 
of the reform rather than exerting a greater effect. Another way to interpret this is that the 
positive effect of more per pupil funding was not a significant enough variable to cancel out the 
well-documented obstacles to academic success found in urban and rural schools or those 
serving high numbers of African American students. In fourth grade reading, larger class size 
also had a negative effect on NSE. Under-resourced and over-stressed reading teachers were not 




able to improve outcomes for their students, which likely had negative implications for these 
students in other academic subjects.  
In total, this analysis of trends using the NSE demonstrates NCLB not only negatively 
impacted the academic achievement in states with large percentages of African American 
students and students attending urban and rural schools, but in both cases the policy had an 
increasingly negative effect on these states over time. Furthermore, not only did the policy fail 
the very students it was designed to benefit, but it may be possible that in states with decreasing 
NSEs, all students were negatively impacted by the decreasing expectations of what one must 
know to demonstrate “proficiency” under No Child Left Behind.  
 
5.2 Limitations of this Study  
Studies that utilize NAEP data provide compelling evidence on achievement trends under 
NCLB, but using NAEP for NCLB evaluation is inherently problematic. Critics note that NAEP 
outcomes can be insensitive to NCLB since, unlike state assessments, NAEP, as a national test, 
is not designed to reveal and help remedy state-specific weaknesses in achievement (e.g., 
specific groups or regions that underperform or specific subject areas that are weak across the 
state) (e.g., Popham, 2005). NAEP is not a high-stakes test for which schools prepare their 
students. It tests an array of skills that is far wider than the average statewide curriculum 
standards, and is therefore a policy-independent assessment (Feuer et al., 1999; National 
Assessment Governing Board, 2002).  
In this regard, lack of or limited progress in NAEP for a given state, may be an indication 
that NCLB worked in that state, particularly if such NAEP outcomes are coupled with growth in 
proficiency gains in the state assessment itself. This argument implies that, despite the broad 




consensus on NCLB’s ineffectiveness, there may be a hidden virtue behind most curricular, 
assessment, and instructional decisions in the states that lead to progress in learning which 
NAEP cannot fully or properly detect. Accountability advocates argue that narrower (or more 
“focused”) curricula and assessments, and teaching to the test are essentially unproblematic if 
they help schools concentrate energies on well-defined goals for each grade level, which in the 
aggregate would benefit students (e.g., Phelps, 2003; Edelman, 2015). 
This dissertation attempts to address this limitation by taking advantage of both the state-
reported proficiency information and the state-level NAEP outcomes, using the NAEP scale 
equivalent (NSE) for percent proficient in the state. 
As mentioned previously, constructing the NSE also produces a “relative error” in 
mapping percent proficient onto the NAEP scale that has affected the validity of previous 
attempts to use the NSE. Factors such as differences in student motivation regarding the two 
tests, the time of year tests are administered, and the format of the test can also contribute to the 
conversion problem in limited degrees (Feuer et al., 1999). The relative error (RE) is based on 
how well the NSE can reproduce percent proficient in individual NAEP schools – in previous 
studies, the RE has proven to be a problem that plagues attempts at conversion and diminishes 
the value of such attempts at analysis. To address this limitation, I used the RE as the basis for 
observation weights in my estimation. In other words, observations involving NSEs with greater 
mapping errors are weighted less than those with smaller mapping errors. This adjustment not 
only improves on previous attempts at mapping, but it also provides an unprecedented degree of 
accuracy.  
Although there could be many state-level characteristics that impact the NSE, this study 
deliberately limited its analysis to an essential set of school and non-school state features 




available through the Common Core of Data and the American Communities Survey. A more 
robust analysis might have also accounted for the effects of state-level politics on the NSE, as 
such an analysis might have “washed out” or overridden the effects of these other variables. 
Because NCLB mandated federally enforced state sanctions against struggling schools, news 
coverage and the public controversy over NCLB made it clear that there were heavily politicized 
attempts to push back against this federal intrusion in the name of local control (Heck, 2004). 
Such dynamics are more likely in states that are politically more conservative. Elazar (1984) 
attributes this to political orientations underlying a preference for “small government.” By 2005, 
various bills critical of NCLB were introduced in 20 states. The severest ones came from 
conservative states. Key examples include Utah, which enacted a bill stating that Utah law 
superseded federal law, and Colorado, which allowed districts to decline to participate in NCLB 
without incurring state penalties (Center on Education Policy, 2006). In some states, actions by 
districts sparked broader resistance to evaluation under NCLB, some districts going as far as 
rejecting funds to avoid compliance (Loveless, 2007). With all of this as background, it would 
have been interesting to see if the analysis shows more conservative states having a lower NSE 
over time, which would reduce the risk of federal involvement. Although this could also be a 
direction for future study, because the state’s political orientation might have diminished, 
overridden, or “washed out” the effects of other school or non-school factors, I view this as a 
potential limitation.  
 
5.3 Implications for Future Research 
This study measures learning outcomes for fourth grade mathematics and fourth grade 
reading during the peak years of NCLB, 2003-2009.  It looks at the effects of key non-school and 




school factors known to influence performance by mapping state-reported proficiency onto the 
NAEP using a novel measure, the NSE, while measuring the respective effects of critical 
variables both in the aggregate and broken down in time interactions for each of the four periods.    
Future studies can look at additional grade levels and subjects to see how the effects of 
these predictor variables change over time. If certain effects persist across multiple grades, 
subjects, and years, the implications for developing policy to address these systemic trends could 
be beneficial.  
Because most of the punitive aspects of NCLB were dislodged by the adoption of 
Common Core State Standards (CCSS) and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), it would 
also be of value to study the trends in NSE after 2009. Because institutional legitimacy and 
continued access to resources are not in as great a jeopardy as they were under NCLB, what are 
the patterns revealed by studying the NSE now? In the absence of punitive sanctions after 2009, 
did academic expectations improve (as measured by the NSE) for the student subgroups that 
suffered under No Child Left Behind? If so, this strengthens the validity of Campbell’s Law, 
which more policy makers should attempt to understand before supporting educational reforms 
that prioritize quantitative growth (as measured by percent proficient) on a largely qualitative 
endeavor (such as public education).  
 
5.4 Implications for Future Policy 
State-Reported Proficiency is Unreliable  
Multiple studies suggest that states complied with the federal requirements of NCLB by 
inflating measures of student proficiency (Linn et al., 1990; Shepard, 1990; Koretz et al., 1991; 
Stecher & Barron 1998; Klein et. al. 2000). By arbitrarily adjusting the standards for proficiency 




and manipulating the reporting conventions, states could symbolically comply in order to 
maintain their standing and remain eligible for the external resources that would ensure their 
organizational survival. These states may not have consciously chosen to impact students and 
student learning in negative ways, but accountability pressures, compounded with the difficulty 
of overcoming racial and economic variables, may have incentivized finding creative ways to 
demonstrate their effectiveness as educational institutions. If this tendency is real, the federally 
enforced punitive sanctions introduced under NCLB may have only broadened and accelerated 
these strategic responses.  
Such patterns of strategic response are often used to explain why student achievement has 
been slow to improve on low-stakes national assessments compared to the impressive 
proficiency gains reported on high-stakes state assessments (Barton & Coley, 2010; Dee & 
Jacob, 2011). As the results of Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate, evaluations of educational policy 
based on percent proficient can have the unfortunate consequence of masking the lower 
standards for academic success for already disadvantaged students.  
A more rigorous analysis of academic outcomes from the peak years of this reform is 
critical as the nation has recently adopted NCLB’s successor, ESSA (Every Student Succeeds 
Act), which is predicated on the same assumption that proficiency-based accountability is an 
effective approach to achieving equity in public education. Efforts to evaluate NCLB by relying 
on state-reported proficiency outcomes are problematic in that such outcomes are based on 
assessment systems and parameters that vary over time as well as across states. Although NSE is 
one way to evaluate the impacts of this policy, future policy decisions should be based on 
analytical approaches that have either standardized (or circumvented) percent proficient as 
reported by the state.  




Addressing School and Non-School Factors 
Sociology is uniquely positioned to address social, economic, and political factors that 
affect learning. My analysis suggests that high-stakes accountability incentivizes strategic or 
symbolic responses because the law requires compliance without regard for key school and non-
school factors that have long-proven to have adverse effects on academic achievement.  
Correcting this may require policy makers to give education the same degree of concern various 
other policies receive, such as national defense and sound energy policy. Although it would be 
difficult to do, accountability can be refocused to address non-school and school disparities that 
would – as a natural outcome of more equitable social policies – improve educational outcomes 
for historically struggling subgroups.  
Future educational policy may be more productive if it avoids punishing schools (Center 
on Education Policy, 2006). A more supportive approach for struggling schools, which, for 
instance, brings new resources and attempts to proactively address social and economic 
challenges in the surrounding communities would not only be more effective, but may also be 
more popular within the communities it aims to improve. By negating the emphasis on 
quantitative measure to evaluate educational systems, there may be less incentive for struggling 
schools and states to comply in strategic and symbolic ways. By focusing on public policies that 
attempt to mitigate the effects of critical school and non-school factors indicated in this 
dissertation, stakeholders can focus on achieving the spirit of high-minded reforms rather than 








Anticipating Strategic and Symbolic Responses 
 Regardless of its incarnation, accountability in public education continues to present 
challenges. Policy makers should also do more to understand the conditions that provoke largely 
strategic and symbolic responses so they can design policy to reduce the likelihood of an 
institutional response that does not achieve the intended outcomes. An abbreviated history of the 
Common Core State Standards (CCSS) illustrates this point.  
For states, the adoption of these new standards was one of the ways they could escape the 
demands of the previous accountability mandates under NCLB. Although adoption of CCSS was 
said to be voluntary, there were clear and early institutional incentives for states to embrace this 
initiative. In July 2009, Obama’s Education Department announced Race to the Top (RTTT), a 
$3.4 billion grant program for states willing to embrace significant reform. The RTTT 
application awarded points to states that had agreed to adopt CCSS (McNeil & Klein, 2011), and 
in the post-recession economy at the time, that alone might have been a great incentive.  
By the end of 2010, 38 states, the District of Columbia and the territories of America 
Samoa and the Virgin Islands had adopted the CCSS (Center for Educational Policy, 2015). 2011 
saw six more states added the list of those supporting the initiative in addition to the adoption of 
CCSS by the Northern Marina Islands (2015). The endorsements by Wyoming in 2012 and 
Arizona in 2013 signaled the high-water mark for CCSS, with 46 states having officially 
embraced this new common core curriculum as the next step in educational improvement.  
In August of 2011, President Obama revealed the details of a long-awaited waiver plan to 
help states escape the punitive sanctions that were increasing under NCLB as AYP targets 
became harder to meet. To be eligible for these NCLB waivers, states had to have adopted 
college and career readiness standards (McNeil & Klein, 2011). As institutional expectations 




shifted – as the definition of legitimacy and the requirements ensure continued access to 
resourced changed – the number of waivers states were granted to escape various aspects of 
accountability increased dramatically. Two months after the announcement of program, 42 states 
had expressed their intent to apply for these waivers (Center for Educational Policy, 2015). By 
January of 2015, 42 of the 50 states had received waivers of some kind, essentially wiping out all 
of the emphasis on accountability that had been the hallmark of NCLB (Center for Educational 
Policy, 2015).      
Because early allegiance to CCSS was a necessary condition for getting waivers from the 
federal mandates of NCLB and satisfied the requirements for Race to the Top funds under the 
Obama Administration, making these decisions may have been motivated by a desire to preserve 
the state’s legitimacy. Even though states had done all they could to satisfy the requirements of 
NCLB, when the public conversation about educational reform started to change, there were 
significant incentives for symbolic compliance and ceremonial adoption of CCSS. As the reform 
has materialized, been challenged, and become politicized, states have backed out by the dozens. 
In most cases, they have kept the substance of the common core (which means they are still 
eligible for all of the federal benefits), but renamed their curricular standards to signal their 
desire to be seen as an autonomous state, independent from federal oversight – a position that 
both ensures continued access to resources and imbues them with institutional legitimacy. 
This short history of CCSS demonstrates the power both sociological concepts – 
organizational legitimacy and resource dependence – have on schools and states. Any future 
policy that fails to understand the conditions that provoke strategic or symbolic, rather than 
substantive, institutional responses may motivate individual actors to distort or corrupt their 
processes in ways that benefit the organization.  
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Table 4: State-level percent proficient and NAEP scale equivalent (NSE) 
(Alaska through Hawaii) 
 
 




Table 4: (Continued) State-level percent proficient and NAEP scale equivalent (NSE) 
(Iowa through Michigan) 
 
 




Table 4: (Continued) State-level percent proficient and NAEP scale equivalent (NSE) 
(Minnesota through Nevada) 
 
 




Table 4: (Continued) State-level percent proficient and NAEP scale equivalent (NSE) 
(New York through Utah) 
 
 




Table 4: (Continued) State-level percent proficient and NAEP scale equivalent (NSE) 
(Virginia through Wyoming) 
 
i For details on NAEP’s sample design, see https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ 
assessment_process/samplesfaq.aspx. 
  
ii Data source: http://usa.ipums.org/usa. State means used in my analysis are weighted averages constructed using the 
person weight variable “PERWT” in ACS. Analysis results using unweighted versions of the measures are similar to 
those reported here. 
 
 
 
 
